企业职工对未来可持续的高工资和管理层对未来低劳动力成本的不同期望,可能导致两者对会计稳健性需求的差异。本文以Khan et al.(2009)的C Score为会计稳健性的计量方式,分析了职工薪酬、工资刚性与会计稳健性的关系。结果显示:较高的职工薪酬与较强的会计稳健性相联系;工资的向下刚性特征与较强的会计稳健性相联系;作为工会规模代理变量的职工人数也与会计稳健性显著正相关。此外2008年实行《新劳动合同法》之后,企业的会计稳健性有了显著提高,这也可能侧面体现了职工与会计稳健性的关系。本文的研究意义在于联结了传统的职工薪酬研究和会计稳健性研究,对Watts(2003)提出的与会计稳健性相关的契约集合进行了扩展,显示了职工薪酬契约对会计稳健性的影响。
In a changing transition economy, Chinese government regulations that adopt the relatively simple bright line rule formula are enforceable in practice. Taking the early reform-oriented policies of the China Securities Regulatory Commission(CSRC) as an example, we find that the CSRC did not consider local enthusiasm for reform when allocating IPO resources because of the high enforcement costs involved. We also find that CSRC listed company regulations were enforced due to the lower costs involved in verifying regulatory violations, and that listed companies that completed the reform process were given priority in public refinancing. We present empirical evidence supporting the theoretical basis for the hypotheses outlined above. We also conclude that companies that completed the reform process in 2005 were of significantly higher quality and that the SEO regulation did not affect stock market efficiency. These findings enhance our understanding of the efficiency of government regulation in a transition economy.
Firms in China have faced high political costs during China's economic transition,because they are affected by macroeconomic policies.However,research to date has offered no consistent conclusions on the relationship between political costs and earnings management in China.This study tests whether real estate firms attempt to decrease earnings during periods of macroeconomic control,using variables related to the national real estate market as proxies for political costs.We find that political costs are negatively related to earnings management in listed real estate firms.In addition,we find that non-state-owned enterprises utilized more income-decreasing accruals during this period.Our results are consistent with the political costs hypothesis.
This paper focuses on the effect of relative performance evaluation(RPE) on top managers' compensation in Chinese public firms. Overall, we find no evidence of an RPE effect or any asymmetry in firms' use of RPE. The results obtained using Albuquerque's(2009) method are similar to those obtained using traditional methods. In addition, we find that RPE is used more in non-SOEs than in SOEs. This may be due to the regulation of compensation,various forms of incentives and the multiple tasks of managers in SOEs.
The management of future financial risk on the part of managers and changes in firm finances are two of the fundamental reasons for upward and downward rigidity of wages.The proxy variable for firm financial risk is volatility,the past performance of which is among the principal indicators of wage rigidity.In firms whose current performance is on the upswing,the greater the volatility in past performance,the smaller the elasticity ratio and the more acute the upward rigidity;the more stable past performance,the larger the elasticity ratio and the more acute the upward elasticity.In firms in which current performance is declining,greater past performance volatility leads to a larger elasticity ratio and more acute downward rigidity,whereas more stable such performance leads to a smaller elasticity ratio and more acute downward rigidity.